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October 28, 1962	Cable no. 330 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček) Pavlicek writes of the negotiations between Khrushchev and Kennedy and of the Cuban people's reaction to them, which is mixed. Among the higher ranking intelligentsia, there is a suspicion that Cuba's defenses will be weakened. Among the lower-level staff, Khrushchev is met with trust and understanding. The Czechoslovak Press Agency is to publish the events in favor of the Soviet Union, portraying it as forcing the United States to negotiate.
October 28, 1962	Cable no. 328 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček) Pavlicek informs Prague that Cuban anti-aircraft forces fended off and shot down a group of U.S. jet bombers, which were assumed to be on a mission to examine the missile bases in Cuba. He also intercepted a message from Washington that if Cuba does not leave a free zone for American personnel to land and inspect the bases, there will be "further action." The bases are not to be dismantled, and an invasion by the United States is to be anticipated.
October 28, 1962	Report to CPCz General Secretary Antonin Novotný Further reports from Pavlicek indicate despite soft rhetoric from the United States indicating a willing to negotiate, aggressive preparations against Cuba continued. In particular, there was a large reinforcement of air force bases in Florida and Key West, as well as an announcement of increased intensity of air reconnaissance over Cuba. By the time of this message, there already have been exchanges between Cuban anti-aircraft guns and U-2 recon planes. However, there are no significant measures observed among military installations in Europe, with Czechoslovak troops maintaining maximum combat readiness. Very few instances of insubordination and dissent are found.
October 27, 1962	Cable no. 326 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček) The cable concerns a conversation between Vrana and Pinner the night before, about Castro's conviction of an impending invasion of Cuba by the United States and associated mercenaries. Prague is told if that event comes to pass, all classified documents in the embassy will be burned. Emergency measures are being prepared, and tensions are evidently high.
October 27, 1962	Report to CPCz General Secretary Antonin Novotný The report to Novotny details the happenings of the Cuban Missile Crisis at that time. Great Britain feels out of the loop and hurt by not being consulted by the United States before it took action, while Kennedy is not backing down on the blockade until the missiles are removed. According to the message, it is unclear whether there are nuclear missiles in Cuba at all; an American army colonel admits to the UN that no traces have been found, despite hundreds of photographs taken. In Czechoslovakia, the situation is unchanged; troops are still on alert and awaiting combat orders, with morale running high. There are even some volunteers willing to go to Cuba and aid their Latin comrades.
October 23, 1962	Telegram from Mexican Embassy, Guatemala City A telegram from the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala commenting on the speech made by U.S. President Kennedy. The Mexican Embassy says "President Kennedy’s speech tells us that the giant finally woke up and that it will abandon its paralysis and lack of foresight, for a state of arms at the ready and alertness. Guatemala in its great anticommunist majority is prepared as a democratic country to align with our brothers of America."
October 23, 1962	Telegram from Mexican Foreign Ministry to Mexican Embassy, Rio de Janeiro A telegram from the Mexican Foreign Ministry to the Mexican Embassy in Brazil describing a United States resolution was approved. The resolution contains two fundamental points: that Soviet bases in Cuba will be dismantled, and that authorization was given for member states to adopt individual or collective measures including the use of armed force. The resolution was voted for in parts and Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia abstained from voting on the second part. The impression of the Mexican Foreign Ministry is that the present international situation is of great seriousness.
October 25, 1962	Cable no. 323 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček) The cable states Cuba has alerted its armed forces to maximum combat readiness. Cuba's government had already taken the precautions of arresting known counterrevolutionaries in all aspects of society, with all important factors monitored. General aura of the country is one of tenseness, but the people continue about their lives as normal. There is a sense of strong revolutionary unity in the wake of this blockade, especially after a speech given by Castro. Cable concludes with a message that the first Soviet ship arrived on the basis of not carrying any military hardware.
October 24, 1962	Cable no. 319 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Vladimir Pavlíček) This cable sent to Prague confirms the decision by President John F. Kennedy to blockade Cuba, based on talks between Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa and Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev. Despite no orders for the American warships to stop Soviet ships, Alekseev was preparing in anticipation for "dangerous provocations." Cuba canceled all PanAm flights, while at the same time allowing Czech and Soviet flights to proceed.
October 23, 1962	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Mexican Foreign Ministry official and Mexican Ambassador to Brazil The Brazilian and Mexican diplomats to Cuba weigh in on their respective governments' opinions on the Cuban crisis and increasing U.S.-Cuban tensions.