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Documents

May 21, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 32

Protocol 32 gives hint to the consternation Khrushchev faced to have his plan of missiles placed in Cuba approved. It took two separate meetings and four days for the Presidium to conceded to Khrushchev's plan.

November 2, 1962

Ciphered Telegram from Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to the Central Committee for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.

October 27, 1962

Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev

A telegram dispatched from the Soviet embassy in Havana early on the morning of Saturday, 27 October 1962. Fidel Castro was at the embassy and composing an important "personal" message for Nikita Khrushchev. The alarmed Cuban leader anticipated US invasion in the next "24-72 hours."

October 23, 1962

Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev

A report on Alekseev's 23 October 1962 conversation with Fidel Castro, together with two members of the Cuban leadership, the day after the public crisis began. Presented with official Soviet statements on the crisis, Castro reviews the situation and confidently vows defiance to the US "aggression," which he claimed was doomed to failure.

November 2, 1962

Cable from Japanese Embassy in Moscow to Tokyo

Describes the domestic reaction in Moscow following the Cuban Blockade by the US. The cable discusses how the real sense of crisis had been widespread in society, and that after the crisis was over there was a sense of relief.

October 26, 1962

Cable from Japanese Embassy in Havana to Tokyo

A description of the situation in Cuba due to the US blockade. The Japanese Embassy officials are discussing Cuban reactions as well as expectations of Soviet involvement.

October 24, 1962

Cable from Japanese Embassy in Moscow to Tokyo

A cable from the Foreign Minister Ohira to the Charges d'affaires ad interim Shigemitsu regarding the situation in Moscow over the Cuban blockade. The cable gives an overall report of the atmosphere in Moscow by describing the people and press gathered around the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

December 14, 1962

Mongolian Embassy in Moscow, Record of Conversation between the Mongolian Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade Alberto Mora Becerra

Mongolian Ambassador in Moscow Luvsan and the visiting Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade Alberto Mora make plans for future trade negotiations between Mongolia and Cuba. They also discuss the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the effect of the US embargo on Cuba's trade relations with Latin American countries and the sale of its sugar harvest.

November 28, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana, Conversation with Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodrigue

Summary of comments made by Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Rodriguez criticizes the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw its missiles, questioning the Soviet commitment to the defense of Cuba.

November 10, 1962

Soviet Report on the Cuban Missile Crisis Based on Intelligence Materials

Summary of intelligence sources reporting that the US had been preparing for an invasion of Cuba and Kennedy only used the installation of missiles as a pretext to carry out aggressive actions. The US carried out the blockade also to warn the Soviet Union against signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to strengthen the position of the Democratic Party before the election. According to the report, other capitalist countries agreed that it was only the flexible policy of the USSR that prevented the outbreak of war.

Pagination