Chen asks Khrushchev to go over the pressing international issues and he presents the USSR's stances on the situation in Laos, South Korea, and Cuba. Khrushchev also raises problems in GDR and difficulties in negotiations with Western powers with regards to the German question. Khrushchev also mentions Soviet plans to launch a spaceship and resume nuclear testing. The two leaders also discuss the challenges of agricultural development.

Zhou and Kosygin discussed the conflicts in Vietnam. They discussed in details of providing logistic and political supports to North Vietnam.

PCB Politburo member Jorge Kolle Cueto asks on 7 March 1967 to inform the Czechoslovak Communist Party, "on behalf of the CC of the Bolivian CP," regarding "the situation in Bolivia… and his recent meeting with Fidel Castro." After four pages of discussion regarding the depressing internal political situation under 1964 coup leader, General René Barrientos, Kolle announced that "the party must necessarily prepare for the possibility of armed struggle in order to participate in the attempt to overthrow the current regime together with other leftist forces."

Huang Hua says that "the Vietnamese were the Cubans of Asia but rather more dangerous." In addition to commenting on the situation in Indochina, Huang weighs in on Soviet and Cuban policies toward the Third World, events in the Middle East, and China's involvement in the United Nations.

The General Secretary of the Communist Party of Bolivia, Mario Monje, informs Chestnoy about a recent meeting with Che Guevara, in which they discuss the differences in Chinese Communist leadership policies. Guevara states that if forced to choose between the two sides, Cuban leadership would be on the side of the Soviet Union.

Pavlicek reports that Chinese representatives in Cuba have launched an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign, aimed towards all levels of the Cuban population. He mentions that many Cubans in favor of Chinese propaganda activity have expressed the opinion that China will support Cuban revolutionary activity in Latin America.

Instructions to Soviet ambassadors on dealing with China's outreach to socialist countries in the eastern bloc, outlining a series of steps for Soviet ambassadors to follow which would
foster skepticism about China’s intentions and thwart efforts by Chinese representatives to make wide-ranging contacts in these states. The directive notes China’s hostility to Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Mongolia and contrasts this with its development of extensive relations with Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea.

Hungarian Ambassador to Bulgaria Karoly Prath summarizes developments on Bulgarian-Cuban relations gathered from Hungarian-Bulgarian diplomatic contacts. Bulgarian-Cuban relations were not adversely effected by the Cuban Missile Crisis. The relationship is dominated by economic development (e.g. the expansion of trade, specialist exchanges, Bulgarian loans to Cuba, the root causes of Cuba's economic difficulties). Prath also discusses Bulgarian concerns over the influence of China on Cuba.

Chargé d’Affaires ad interim Erzsébet Görög writes a preliminary assessment of Castro’s state visit to the Soviet Union in 1963. Görög reports on improvements in Cuba’s party organization and positive reactions from the Cuban public and media on Castro’s visit. Görög notes different reactions to the visit between the economic/technical and artistic intelligentsia, adding that “Khrushchev managed to win Fidel over to his side in the Soviet-Chinese dispute.” Other topics include emigration and external counter-revolutionary activities.