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Documents

March 6, 1976

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.046

The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang summarizes remarks made by Ri Jong-mok, the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister, on the military and security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

October 11, 1975

Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, No. 075119

Romanian diplomats report that Washington considers the situation in Korea to be very dangerous, that a withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea could prompt South Korea to develop nuclear weapons, and that the Algerian-sponsored resolution in support of North Korea at the United Nations General Assembly is unacceptable.

July 24, 1975

Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, No. 074.783

Buffum and Bogdan discuss the US concern regarding the upcoming coming UN general assembly meeting, in which the issue of dismantling the UN headquarters in Korea remains on the agenda, as Buffum hopes to accompany the dismantlement with assurances protecting the armistice, but is worried about North Korea's unpredictable behavior.

July 15, 1975

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 059/219

The North Koreans list the reasons for not accepting the US proposal for the dismantlement of the UN headquarters in South Korea. The source notes that the North Koreans do not want to accept the US presence in Korea nor allow the US to raise the status of South Korea. Nonetheless, the North Koreans look to the recent proposal as a "step back" for the US.

July 1, 1975

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, No. 052648

The North Koreans are suspicious of the proposal to dismantle the UN headquarters in South Korea and believe that the true intent of the plan is creating confusion at this year’s session of the General Assembly. The author believes that the North Koreans will reject the proposal because agreeing to current conditions would be accepting the US presence in Korea.

July 4, 1975

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 01/06647

Budura relays the North Korean belief that the letter sent to the UN regarding the dismantling of the UN headquarters in Korea is an attempt to create confusion at the General Assembly.

December 6, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.537

The document describes how the North Koreans enthusiastically celebrated the consensus of Committee No. 1 over the Korean issue in the UN; however, Lazar believes that the Korean leadership has not actually grasped the full implications of the decision. In addition, the telegram describes how Pyongyang's attempt to reassert control over South Korean islands close to the North Korean shores in the Yellow Sea has created friction between the two countries. The author also mentions that North Korean support for the student movements in South Korea legitimized Seoul's harsher crackdown on the dissident movements.

November 26, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.530

The telegram highlights the new South Korean effort to normalize relations with China and the USSR. Both Soviet and Chinese officials reject the overture from South Korea.

November 26, 1973

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 052312

The document describes a consensus at the UN regarding the Korean issue after an understanding was reached between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. Thea author observes that some of the US media believes that the US came to a compromise solution with China because Nixon wanted to avoid having more political issues.

November 3, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 061.497

Following the end of the inter-Korean dialogue, Zhivkov observes increased antagonism in the rhetoric of the North Koreans regarding unification paralleling the increasing tension between the two Koreas.

Pagination