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Documents

December 1979

The Capability of the Puppet Regime to Launch an Attack on the South: A Comprehensive Analysis

South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Cultural Bureau reports on the current situation and information regarding the risk of a North Korea attack, North Korea's military capabilities, and the definiteness of a possible of a North Korean invasion.

November 22, 1979

Cable, South Korean Ambassador in the UK to South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs

Details from a conversation between the South Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom with Julian Ridsdale, Member of Parliament, on US troops stationed in Korea, the Soviet Union and China's viewpoints on Korea's reunification, and other matters.

December 15, 1979

Telegram from South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs to South Korean Ambassador about South Korean government's position on Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke's problem posing on the 12.12 Incident

A telegram correspondence between South Korea Minister of Foreign Affairs to South Korean Ambassador in regards to Assistant Secretary Holbrooke's discussion of the December 12 incident. The telegram also outlines the events of General Jeong Seung-hwa's arrest.

December 13, 1979

Cable, South Korean Ambassador to the U.S. to the South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs 'Meeting with Assistant Secretary Holbrooke'

A summary of meeting with Assistant Secretary Holbrooke regarding the December 12th incident. Holbrooke asks for direct communication between the US and South Korean officials, while discussing the possibility of North Korean invasion and media coverage of this issue.

July 11, 1948

Record of Conversation between Kim Gu and Liu Yuwan

Kim Gu (Kim Koo) and the Chinese Nationalist Minister Liu Yuwan discuss Kim's participation in the South Korean government, his attendance at a conference in Pyongyang, and the possibility of a Russian-led attack on southern Korea.

July 27, 1953

Notes on Visit of General Clark with President Rhee (8:30-8:55, 27 July 1953)

General Clark tries to convince President Rhee to attend the armistice signing, emphasizing that Kim Il Sung will not be present. Ambassador Briggs then reports that President Eisenhower has approved $200 million in aid for Korean rehabilitation.

August 7, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (Third Session)

President Rhee and Secretary Dulles have concluded the final negotiations for the US-ROK defense pact and now both believe it is time to inform the American and Korean public. Rhee emphasizes that he will not accept Korean neutralization and it is imperative to remove the Chinese from the north. Dulles states that the US will do its best to unify Korea under one peaceful government and will try to remove the Chinese aggressors in the north.

August 6, 1953

Proposed Joint Statement by President Rhee and Secretary Dulles

In this proposed joint statement, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles discuss the terms for the joint security pact between the ROK and the US.

August 3, 1953

Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

August 6, 1953

Summary Memorandum, US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (August 6)

In 1953, Secretary Dulles met President Rhee to discuss the US-ROK mutual defense treaty. This summary memorandum notes twelve of Rhee’s requests and/or points he will like this treaty to incorporate. These include the number of ROKA divisions, which economic model the US should use to help Korea’s economy, and the request for moral and material support for the ROK to resume war with the north. This summary also notes whether the US granted, wanted to further discuss, or rejected each point.

Pagination