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Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

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Anwar Sadat in 1975

Sadat, Anwar

1918- 1981

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August 22, 1955	Memorandum of Conversation between the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt D.S. Solod and the director of the Prime Minister’s office, A. Sabri President Nasser criticizes the Israeli attack at the Gaza strip which involves Egyptian soldiers. He requests immediate military aid from the Soviet Union in case of future incidents by Israeli or British forces.
September 15, 1955	Memorandum of Conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Egypt D.S. Solod and Egypt’s Prime Minister G. Nasser President Nasser discusses a Soviet-Egyptian arms deal and claims he is pleased with the agreement. However, he worries that Britain will no longer supply arms to Egypt as a result of this agreement.
February 5, 1972	Notes of the Discussion Between President Tito and President Sadat
August 15, 1956	Ministry for State Security, Main Department II, ‘Egypt’ The economic relations between the GDR and the Republic of Egypt are presented, starting with the trade agreement signed on May 7, 1953, and the exchange of consular representation. Political relations between the countries were hindered, according to the report, by pressure from the FRG on Egypt and the question of whether recognizing the GDR meant creating a deeper split between the FRG and the GDR. The report also mentions problems in meeting the export and import plans set forth in the trade agreement, including unpunctuality on the side of the GDR’s trade missions. The report states that Nasser enjoys great popularity in his country as a result of his position towards the West, social politics within the country, cooperation with other Arab countries and improvements in the industrial sector. This is followed by a detailed description of Egypt’s political situation and a proposition to extend political and economic cooperation while trying to reduce the influence of the West. Finally, the report recommends continued rejection of Israel's demands for compensation.
June 28, 1967	The Visit of the Czechoslovak President's Special Envoy, V. Koucki, to the UAR The document summarizes Czechoslovak Politburo Secretary Vladimir Koucki's conversations with UAR President Gamal A. Nasser, Vice President Zakaria Muhi al-Din,and Arab Socialist Union (ASU) Secretary Ali Sabri during his visit to the UAR. The conversations concerned the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the UAR's military and economic situation. Koucki draws three conclusions about the UAR's position, mentioning pressure from internal and external reactionary forces and the lagging national economy. The appendix contains a report on military issues raised during a conversation between the commander of the UAR armed forces, General Muhammad Fawzi, and General Miroslav Smoldash of the Czech delegation. Koucki attributes Egypt's defeat in the war to technical and tactical weaknesses of the military leadership. He recommends that Czech cooperation with the UAR include economic support, military training, and delivery of military equipment.
June 2007	A Directive from the Centre. Folder 79. The Chekist Anthology. This 25 April 1974 directive from the Centre is attributed to an author identified as “Sviridov.” It was sent to KGB Line A residencies in Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Aden, Samaa, and others, and contains instructions for planning “active measures.” “Sviridov” identified a variety of channels through which the KGB could influence Middle Eastern governments, militaries, and political groups, while suppressing anti-Soviet groups. Additionally, the residencies were instructed to plan active measures in advance to prepare for future contingencies. In an explanatory note, Mitrokhin explains that “Sviridov” is a pseudonym for then KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, and that Line A is the arm of the KGB concerned with active measures intended to influence foreign countries.
May 30, 1967	Minutes of Conversation between Yugoslav President Josip Borz Tito and UAR Ambassador Mohamed Handy Abuzeid, in Varga Minutes of conversation between Tito and UAR ambassador Mohamed Handy Abuzeid, discussing the situation in the Middle East. The ambassador states the UAR's goal is peace thought a diplomatic solution at the UN. They also discuss Yugoslavia's problems with Greece and how the Yugoslavs might improve relations with Albania. Yugoslavia and the UAR express their hope to improve economic ties and maintain their good relations.
September 1, 1981	A Report by Soviet Military Intelligence Soviet Military Intelligence assess the equipment provided to Afghan counterrevolutionaries by the US, Britian, Egypt, and Pakistan.
July 18, 1967	Memorandum of a Meeting between Houari Boumédiène, Abd al-Rahman Arif, Leonid I. Brezhnev, and Alexei Kosygin Arif and Boumedienne talked to Brezhnev and Kossygin about the Six-Day War and discussed with them the possibilities for the Arab countries. The first possibility is to negotiate with the US and Israel and the second, to continue fighting, regardless of the cost. The Algerian representatives favored the second option, suggesting that otherwise an overthrow of the progressive Arab governments would be likely. Brezhnev and Kossygin argued, however, that a political solution would be more appropriate and that the main goal at the present time should be to strengthen the armies of Syria, Jordan and the UAR, and to support these countries in every respect.
June 2007	About the Middle East. Folder 81. The Chekist Anthology Information on the situation in the Middle East prepared by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov in April 1973, prior to a 7 May 1973 discussion in the Politburo. Andropov stated that given the increase in anti-Israeli propaganda in Egypt and Syria, as well as the heightened state of readiness of their armies, it was possible that a coalition of Middle Eastern states could resume military operations against Israel before, or during the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit. To prevent this, the KGB initiated a series of active measures. Specifically, they dispatched KPSU Politburo Candidate Member K.G. Mazurov to speak with Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Assad on the USSR’s behalf; informed the United States government through unofficial channels that a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East was not in Moscow’s interests; delayed the delivery of new Soviet surface to surface missiles to Egypt; and dispatched a well known Soviet journalist specializing in Middle Eastern affairs to Cairo and Damascus to study the situation.