Weiss and Nasser discuss the events of the 1967 Arab-Israeli or Six-Day War.

The document describes the negotiations between Soviet leaders and Nasser, which mainly focused on the conflict in the Middle East and the possible recognition of the GDR by the United Arab Republic. Nasser emphasized that there would be no direct talks between the UAR and Israel, but that the UAR would be willing to take part in a UN negotiated attempt to solve the conflict, upon the condition that Israel withdraw its troops from the occupied territories. Nasser was reluctant to follow the Soviet demand for a diplomatic recognition of the GDR.

Ulbricht writes to Brezhnev about the delegation to the UAR, led by Mr. Weiss. Ulbricht assesses the political situation in the UAR with respect to Nasser and the weak situation of the Arab Socialist Union. Ulbricht also informs Brezhnev about the situation in the SAR, which seems to be worsening due to a lack of concepts for postwar recovery. Ulbricht suggests sending economic and political experts in order to strengthen the cooperation between the UAR, the SAR and the socialist countries.

Ulbricht informs Brezhnev about his visit to the UAR following an invitation from Nasser. He also says that he wants to get in contact with the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs in order to establish a common line to present to the UAR. Ulbricht also announces a visit to the SAR and Iraq.

The conversation is focused on the future development of GDR-Egyptian relations. Ulbricht talks about the agitation that his visit to Egypt caused in West Germany. He also asks Nasser if official diplomatic recognition of the GDR would be possible. Nasser asks for economic support for other newly independent African states. Nasser and Ulbricht also consider general questions of agriculture and the transition to a socialist economy.

The conversation is about the joint statement on issues of economic and cultural cooperation that will be signed by Ulbricht and Nasser. They talk about the opening of an Egyptian consulate general in Berlin and consider questions of agriculture.

The economic relations between the GDR and the Republic of Egypt are presented, starting with the trade agreement signed on May 7, 1953, and the exchange of consular representation. Political relations between the countries were hindered, according to the report, by pressure from the FRG on Egypt and the question of whether recognizing the GDR meant creating a deeper split between the FRG and the GDR. The report also mentions problems in meeting the export and import plans set forth in the trade agreement, including unpunctuality on the side of the GDR’s trade missions. The report states that Nasser enjoys great popularity in his country as a result of his position towards the West, social politics within the country, cooperation with other Arab countries and improvements in the industrial sector. This is followed by a detailed description of Egypt’s political situation and a proposition to extend political and economic cooperation while trying to reduce the influence of the West. Finally, the report recommends continued rejection of Israel's demands for compensation.

The directive mentions the rules for a GDR delegation visiting Egypt. The goal of the visit was the conclusion of a trade agreement advantageous to both countries. The delegates had to reject any discriminatory remarks against the GDR and other socialist countries, observe the press coverage about the meeting, pay close attention to political remarks, not contact other Germans in Egypt, and contact East Berlin if problems were to occur.

The report outlines the negotiations and discusses the importance of GDR support for the Arab countries, foremost Egypt. Having as its example the GDR-Finland trade agreement, the GDR-Egyptian trade agreement would be based on the exchange of goods in the amount of $13.5 million, which, for the Egyptian side, would consist mainly of cotton export. A credit was negotiated at 500,000 Egyptian Pounds. The report also mentions the satisfaction of the Egyptian government with the GDR for not having signed a reconciliation treaty with Israel. Also, a trade mission of the GDR’s foreign commerce office was discussed and approved by the Egyptian side.