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Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Cuban Foreign Relations

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

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Central Africa

Angola

Cuba and Southern Africa

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South America

Brazil

President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

United States-Soviet Relations

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

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Alekseyev, Alexander Ivanovich

1913- 1989

Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894- 1971

China and Latin America and the Caribbean

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Risquet, Jorge

1930- 2015

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Castro Ruz, Raul Modesto

1931-

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Kudryavtsev, Sergey Mikhailovich

1915- 1998

Sino-Soviet Relations

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November 8, 1962	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba Investigation Group, 'Guevara's Mother Talked About the Soviet-Cuban Relationship' A cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba describing a visit by Guevara's mother [Celia de la Serna y Llosa], Madam Moke, and Abraham Guillén [a Marxist author].
November 16, 1962	Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, Havana, 16 November 1962 The conversation takes place soon after the IL-28 crisis, which gives Mikoyan a chance to patch up the relationship with trade agreements and promises of future aid and industrial cooperation. Near the end of the conversation, Guevara and Mikoyan discuss the theory of revolutionary struggle. Guevara shares his vision that “further development of the revolutions in Latin America must follow the line of simultaneous explosions in all countries.” Mikoyan cautions him, pointing to the Soviet experience and using the metaphor of the rebellion on the battleship “Potemkin.” Hinting at further disagreement ahead, he gently registers his disagreement with the Cuban leader’s drive to ignite revolution in the hemisphere.
November 13, 1962	Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, Havana The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.
November 11, 1962	Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.
December 3, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71 Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”
November 16, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66 Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.
October 28, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 63 According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.
November 8, 1962	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'A Brief Report of a Cuban Military Intelligence Official’s Talk' According to military intelligence, the situation between US and Cuba has "calmed down". There are fewer fly-overs and the American Navy has backed away from Cuban territory.
November 9, 1962	Cable from the Military Attache of the Chinese Embassy in Iraq, 'Mercenaries Used by United States to Invade Cuba' The Chinese Embassy in Iraq passes on information from the Cuban Embassy about forces prepared by the CIA for an invasion of Cuba, claiming they included armed anti-Castro exiles of the Cuban Revolutionary Council as well as a separate group of "special agents committed to sabotage and subversion operations."
November 12, 1962	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'A Report of the Conversation with the Deputy Editor of Noticias de Hoy, Raúl Valdes Vivo' A report of a conversation from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba detailing the situation different Latin American countries face in regards to US-Cuba relations, especially in terms of the US economic and naval blockade.