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1021 - 1030 of 1911

Documents

August 3, 1953

Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

August 6, 1953

Summary Memorandum, US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (August 6)

In 1953, Secretary Dulles met President Rhee to discuss the US-ROK mutual defense treaty. This summary memorandum notes twelve of Rhee’s requests and/or points he will like this treaty to incorporate. These include the number of ROKA divisions, which economic model the US should use to help Korea’s economy, and the request for moral and material support for the ROK to resume war with the north. This summary also notes whether the US granted, wanted to further discuss, or rejected each point.

October 2, 1950

Cable, from Chan-Fu to Matveev

Cable stating that orders to retreat by any means possible (in groups, or individually) must be given out immediately to the remaining soldiers and commanders in the South.

September 30, 1950

Cable No. 600308, Shtykov to Stalin, transmitting Letter from Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-Yeong

Telegram from Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yeong telling Stalin of the losses they have incurred following American air and ground attacks in South Korea and of their general lack of supplies and trained personnel.

September 23, 1950

CPSU Politburo Decision to Adopt the Attached Draft Response

Telegram telling Vyshinsky to inform Lancaster that Malik consented to a meeting with the assistant Ahesona or one of the American ambassadors, as suggested by Lancaster. Malik should listen to the State Department official and if it's evident that the Americans are taking a step forward towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, tell him that Malik should ponder the issues mentioned in the conversation.

August 6, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (Second Session)

During the second Dulles-Rhee conference, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles led the discussion with the subject of Korean rehabilitation. Rhee makes a few suggestions that both sides should consider if Korean reconstruction should take place. These suggestions include: 1) rehabilitating Korean productive industry, 2) directly allocating money for Korea’s rehabilitation instead of doing so through the reconstruction of the Japanese economy and, 3) prevent the importation of Japanese technicians to Korea. Dulles answers he will consider Rhee suggestions, however, the US will continue to aid Japan to prevent losing her to communism.

September 2, 1950

Incoming Cable No. 600081, Shtykov to Vyshinky

Shtykov passes on a memorandum to Vyshinsky written by Syngman Rhee to Dr. Robert T. Oliver.

August 5, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (First Session)

In early August of 1950, delegates from the United States and the Republic of Korea met to discuss the logistics for the forthcoming conferences centered on the creation of a strong US-ROK mutual defense treaty. The delegates also propose who can and should be present. While both sides agree that North Korea and China should be included, President Rhee advocates that due to India’s Prime Minister’s “pro-communist views,” India should not be invited.

August 14, 1953

Memorandum, President Syngman Rhee to All Diplomatic Officials

Following the ratification of the Armistice Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty, President Rhee conveys that he expects the Armistice to fail because the communists will “undoubtedly” violate it and undermine Korean independence. Rhee wants to renew war to secure victory but most importantly to strengthen the ROK-U.S alliance. Following the memorandum he makes twelve points ranging from topic like Korean rehabilitation to prisoners of war from the Korean War.

September 2, 1950

CPSU Politburo Decision on the Secret Archives of the Syngman Rhee Government

Decision to entrust Vyshinsky to print in the Soviet press the documents found in the archives of the Syngman Rhee government, seized when the communists took Seoul.

Pagination