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Documents

February 4, 1968

"Information about the Situation in Korea"

A wide ranging Czeck government report on the causes, consequences, and potential resolutions to the USS Pueblo Incident.

September 7, 1966

Report on a Meeting between Enver Hoxha and DPRK Ambassador Baek Sunje

The transcript of the conversation notes North Korea's concerns about South Korea's increasing military size and the continued existence of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Hoxha gives his support for the DPRK position.

August 31, 1976

Report on the ‘Axe Murder Incident’ from the GDR Embassy in North Korea

Report on the killing of two American officers in the Joint Security Area. Ambassador Steinhofer states that this incident is a testimony of the tense situation that exists between the two sides and he provides an analysis of what the implications of this incident are.

May 13, 1976

Report from the GDR Embassy in the USSR, “Note about a Conversation between Comrade Bauer and Comrade Basmanov, Deputy Head of the 1st Far Eastern Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, on 10 May, 1976.”

Summary of a conversation between Comrade Bauer and Comrade Basmanov addressing the personality cult in the DPRK, the socialist development in the DPRK, the DPRK’s economy, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the DPRK. Basmanov, furthermore, compared the DPRK’s relationship with the Soviet Union to its relationship with the PRC.

July 7, 1973

Letter from Kim Il Sung to Enver Hoxha

Kim Il Sung emphasizes the history of Korea as one single country and lays out a five point program for the peaceful reunification. He, moreover, addresses the issue of admission to the UN and underscores that only a united Korea should become a member of this organization.

September 9, 1974

Information about a Visit by Comrades Gericke and Stritzke to the DPRK

Comrades Gericke and Stritzke report on the DPRK’s plans to achieve a socialist society through a technological revolution, a cultural revolution and an ideological revolution.

December 16, 1950

Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

Zhou Enlai advises the Chinese UN representatives on how to explain and respond to representatives from other countries regarding the Korea issue and the proposed armistice.

December 13, 1950

Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

Zhou Enlai expresses that China is the most interested in the opinion of the U.S. and the UN regarding the conditions for an armistice on the Korean peninsula, and makes clear that the 38th parallel is no longer in existence.

December 8, 1950

Telegram from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

The CCP Central Committee gives instructions to the Chinese representatives to the UN on how to reply to confrontation over the Korean issue. The Chinese representatives are to express willingness to end military action as well as desire to know the UN and the U.S.'s positions on the conditions for an armistice.

December 3, 1950

Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

Zhou Enlai gives instructions on how the Chinese side should respond when confronted with questions of whether China should back down in regards to the North Korean issue and the Taiwan issue. In particular, he emphasizes that the Chinese side should focus on blaming American imperialism for the invasions of North Korea and Taiwan and maintaining that China's involvement in these issues is essential.

Pagination