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Documents

July 10, 1953

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between John Foster Dulles and Allen W. Dulles

In a telephone conversation, the Dulles brothers discuss their opposing views in regards to the future direction of Soviet policy following the uprising.

December 27, 1979

Declaration of the CC CPSU to the Party Leadership concerning the Situation in Afghanistan, Attachment to CPSU Politburo Protocol #177

The CC CPSU states that the removal of N. M Taraki, and the rise of H. Amin to political leadership in Afghanistan bolstered counterrevolutionaries. The CC CPSU approved a small military force to stabilize the country, supporting the regional and international interests of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The message is sent to the Members and Candidate Members of the CC CPSU, the Members of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, the CC of the Communist Parties Of Union Republics, Kray Committees, and Oblast Committees of the Party, The Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, the Leningrad City Committee of the CPSU, and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Soviet Navy.

January 8, 1951

Telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting 4 January 1951 message from Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, and Pak Il-u to Kim Il Sung

Message from Mao to Stalin informing him of the PLA's intent to push south of the Han River to capture key staging points such as Gimpo Airport and deny the enemy time to regroup.

December 8, 1978

Cooperative plan between the Interior Ministry of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the KGB of the Soviet Union from the summer of 1979-1981

The parties agree to assist one another in the collection of intelligence information on political, economic, scientific and technical matters and exchange information on suspicious contacts of Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens suspected to be spies or subversive. Both agree to the exchange of counter-intelligence regarding Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens working in scientific organizations and international exhibitions, fairs and congresses. Steps are outlined to protect railroad cargo using troops from Warsaw Pact states, prevent eavesdropping of telecommunications and detect and prevent foreign terrorist attacks on Czechoslovak and Soviet airplanes and anti-socialist interruption of international trucking lines. Special mention is made of multiple international transportation organizations that need to be monitored. Information-sharing procedures are agreed to for commercial and industrial firms, banks, scientific centers and international scientific organizations.

July 10, 1953

CIA Special Supplement to the Current Intelligence Weekly

This CIA report contains a chronological breakdown of the nature and extent of the riots and demonstrations in East Germany, and descriptions of the Soviet reaction, East German capabilities, East German government reaction, and the Soviet policy reaction. According to the report, at this point, the USSR has not yet revealed any long-term policy reaction to the German situation.

July 21, 1953

Intelligence Advisory Committee, Special Estimate (SE-47), 'Probable Effect Of Recent Developments In Eastern Germany On Soviet Policy With Respect To Germany'

This intelligence report presents and analyzes Soviet policy in East Germany before, during, and after the East German Uprising. The report assesses potential actions the Soviets could take in the future towards East Germany, and the likelihood of each.

June 24, 1953

CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 'Indications of [Soviet] Intentions in Europe'

This CIA report states that the recent uprising revealed the Eastern German Communist regime’s dependence on Soviet military force to maintain power and enforce order. Based on activity of Soviet forces, indications of future Soviet intentions in Germany and in Europe are also discussed.

December 11, 1953

National Security Council, NSC 174, Draft 'United States Policy Toward The Soviet Satellites In Eastern Europe'

This report by the National Security Council discusses Soviet control over Eastern Europe, barriers to Soviet control of the satellites, and the power threat that consolidation poses to the United States. As a result, the NSC recommends that United States pursue a policy of resistance towards Soviet domination of its Eastern European satellites, and should impose pressure and propaganda to weaken Soviet influence.

January 16, 1951

Telegram from Mao Zedong to I.V. Stalin, transmitting 14 January 1951 Message from Mao to Peng Dehuai with Message from Kim Il Sung

Mao asks Stalin on his opinion regarding the incorporation of Korean troops into the Chinese army, as well as the possible response of the enemy.

January 29, 1951

Telegram from Mao Zedong to I.V. Stalin, conveying 28 January 1951 telegram from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai

A forward to Stalin of a message sent earlier by Mao to Peng Dehuai. It outlines operational plans for the PLA and KPA in and around Seoul and talks about the need to gain an advantageous military position with negotiations in mind.

Pagination