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Documents

August 28, 1962

Conversation of Cde. N. S. Khrushchev and acting United Nations Secretary General U Thant, 28 August 1962

Khrushchev and Thant discuss the possibility of a visit by Khrushchev to the UN General Assembly. Khrushchev says a visit is not likely until the Americans, French, British and Germans are ready to negotiate a solution to the Berlin question. Khrushchev outlines the Soviet position and says that the Soviet Union will sign a unilateral peace treaty with the GDR if their conditions are not met. He says that the SU would agree to UN intervention and to a multilateral peace treaty, which would avert international conflict and war. Khrushchev suggests that the UN headquarters be transferred to West Germany due to high costs and discrimination in New York. He identifies additional issues for discussion: the admittance of the People's Republic of China into the UN, the Taiwan-China issue, and disarmament. Thant and Khrushchev discuss the obstacles to resolution of the German question, including public opinion in America. They also discuss American dominance in the UN Secretariat, free trade, and the Common Market, among other topics.

July 11, 1983

Information from the Bulgarian Communist Party Regarding the Visit of the Delegation of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) to Bulgaria

Information summarizing the objectives of a visit of the FSLN delegation, headed by Baiardo Arse [name is spelled phonetically], to Bulgaria. The visit, which took place from 28 June to July 3 1983, aimed at exchanging information and ideas on ways to reform FSLN, in order to transform the Front into an avant-garde Marxist-Leninist party.
The document describes the political and economic pressure exerted by the Reagan administration on a number of Central and Latin American countries, in order to decrease the support for the Front and other leftist revolutionary movements. According to the information FSLN responded to these measures by consolidating and strengthening its army, and national militia; maintaining transparency and political pluralism; strengthening the cooperative and state economic sector, and redirecting trade to new markets, mainly in the socialist community.

November 20, 1984

Information on Changes in the Strategic and Tactical Struggle of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL)

A description of measures taken by the military leadership of FMNL to improve the organized struggle in Central America, in terms of creating opportunities for large-scale operations intended to lead to the ultimate defeat of the enemy – the government-supported army of El Salvador. The information was compiled based on sources of the Vietnamese Embassy in Havana, and with the cooperation of the Cuban comrades. According to the document, a decision was made to regroup military units from small squads to battalions and brigades. Following this course, the partisan movements earned considerable success in 1984, but their actions easy to trace due to the size of the new formations. As a result the Front’s combat units, hospitals and supply bases suffered severe blows. The situation at hand required that FMNL reassess its strategy and make important changes in accord with the anticipated victory of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua and that of Reagan in the US. The document states that FMNL’s leadership switched its strategic and tactical line and reverted to armed struggle conducted by small mobile squads. This change aided the suppression of the government armed forces’ offensive.

December 8, 1967

Letter from Ambassador Brie of the GDR in the DPRK to Deputy MFA Hegen

East German Ambassador to North Korea Horst Brie reports on the growing number of incidents at the Demilitarized Zone between North Korean forces and South Korean and U.S. forces. Brie offers his own analysis of the military situation in Korea while highlighting the different views of officials from Czechoslovakia and Poland.

January 29, 1968

Memorandum of Conversation with the Ambassador of the People’s Republic of Hungary, Comrade Kadasch

Ho Seok-tae informs Comrade Kadasch that he is going to send a delegation to the United Nations Security Council to explain the USS Pueblo incident and that he has asked the Hungarians to defend the DPRK at the UN.

January 29, 1968

Memorandum of a Conversation with the Ambassadors of the CSSR, Comrade Holub, and of the People’s Republic of Poland, Comrade Naperei

Upon reviewing the Pueblo incident, both ambassadors conclude that the U.S. violated the Armistice Treaty. Instead of using force to retain their ship and men, the U.S. should issue an apology to the DPRK or else the Koreans will fight back.

January 23, 1968

Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Commander of United States, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)

The ROK Minister of Defense expresses his displeasure for the lack of a U.S. response towards the Blue House Raid as compared to the Pueblo incident.

January 27, 1968

Note on a Conversation with the Polish Ambassador, Comrade Naperei, on 26 January 1968 in the Polish Embassy

Ambassador Jarck reports on a conversation with the Polish Ambassador who spoke of the recent relocation of two squadrons of F-105's from Okinawa to South Korea, North Korean raids on the South, and the United States' moves towards the Swiss and the Neutral Commission Supervisory Commission.

November 9, 1967

Polish Record of Meeting of Soviet-bloc leaders (and Tito) in Moscow

Soviet bloc leaders discuss current UN resolutions being devised to deal with the Middle East crisis and unmask U.S. imperialism at work. They talk about the US's desire to forces Nasser out. They also discuss internal Israeli politics, with dovish president Eshkol pitted against hawkish Defense Minister Dayan. They agree that this may be the best chance to make the Arabs realize that a political solution, not a military one, is necessary to solve the Middle East crisis. Tito pushes for a common resolution of all socialist countries, not just the USSR.

November 19, 1951

Soviet Politburo Decision with Approved Message from Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev requiring more clear explanation about the earlier inquiry regarding Korean situation.

Pagination