This memo to Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, includes proposed amendments and clarifications to various articles and sections of the NPT. Topics of the proposed amendments include an emphasis on the continued importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the exchange of research and technology on peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The document also describes how to proceed in negotiations with the American side, as well as with several Warsaw Pact countries, and to telegraph once the requests in the memo have been delivered.

This decree tasks the Soviet MFA with obtaining an agreement from fellow members of the Warsaw Pact on the USSR's suggested revisions to the NPT.

Andrei Gromyko describes the diplomatic measures he deems necessary to ensure the adherence of influential nations and countries in the Socialist sphere to the NPT. Valuing negotiation and diplomatic conversations between representatives, Gromyko especially seeks to obtain the support of countries who have previously expressed reservations about the treaty.

Talking points for Soviet ambassadors to Socialist states to use in conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs. The ambassadors are told to relay the message that adherence to the NPT is beneficial for all Socialist nations and their allies.

USSR sending regards to the Polish ambassador about Poland joining the international "detection club" for underground nuclear tests.

Kohl and Clinton have a wide ranging discussion on NATO expansion, crises in the Balkans, Chechnya and Northern Africa, relations with Europe, and other subjects.

Polish ambassador and chairman of the Drafting Committee at the 1995 NPT review conference.

Romanian meeting minutes of Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting concerning non-proliferation.

This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”

(Excerpts) Minutes of discussions of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee concerning non-proliferation. The Romanian delegation argues against a joint declaration of the Warsaw Pact on non-proliferation for fear that it might be used against China. The other delegations argue that a joint declaration is necessary in order to prevent the creation of the Multilaterall Nuclear Force proposed by NATO.