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South Asia

Pakistan

Pakistani Nuclear History

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North America

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Nuclear Proliferation

The Taj Mahal Shrine in Agra, India.

South Asia

India

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Pervez, Arshad Z.

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Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

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Eastern Europe

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Indian Nuclear History

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United States. Department of State

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France

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Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad

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United States. Embassy (Pakistan)

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Hungary. Embassy (India)

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Photograph of President Ronald Reagan

Reagan, Ronald

1911- 2004

South African Nuclear History

Chinese Nuclear History

China and South Asia

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May 1999	Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Z Division, 'Challenges of Advanced Nuclear Weapon Development in Pakistan' This study, even more heavily redacted than the Z Division study on India (November 1988), examined the status of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon status, and number of other topics (deleted from the table of contents), and policy implications. The Joint Special Operations Command is among the agencies on the distribution list. As the report is a “Gamma Controlled Item,” some of the excisions relate to communications intelligence information.
December 1979	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2004 Release] This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2004 version, in some instances, contains more information through page 10 than the 2013 version.
December 1979	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2013 Release] This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2013 release (which is currently under appeal) includes some information from a “Secret Test by Others” (Pakistan, India) and the map on page 12 that had not been released before.
June 1978	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Special Projects Division, 'Proliferation Group Quarterly Report, January – March 1978' This issue includes an extract from a recent study on Pakistan and two highly technical articles relating to on-going research to identify the signatures of high explosives used for the implosion method of nuclear detonation. It also includes a report that utilized open literature and classified intelligence, including two satellite photographs, the purpose of the article is to illuminate how the South African Government intended to use the site, down to the depth and thickness of the bore holes.
April 10, 1990	Department of State, Memorandum from Abraham Sofaer to Mr. Kimmit, 'Pakistan Nuclear-Final Resolution of Pervez Case' Pervez’s lawyers had mounted an entrapment defense in 1987 and a Supreme Court decision relating to that defense (Matthews vs. United States) case made it possible for Pervez to launch successfully a bid for retrial on all of the counts. After plea bargaining discussions, a trial was avoided when Pervez pleaded nolo contendere to the count of illegal export of beryllium. He was released from prison on 4 April 1990 on the basis of time served.
January 13, 1990	Department of State, Memorandum from Elizabeth Rindskopf to Mr. Kimmit, 'Pakistan Nuclear-New Trial for Pervez' Pervez’s lawyers had mounted an entrapment defense in 1987 and a Supreme Court decision relating to that defense (Matthews vs. United States) case made it possible for Pervez to launch successfully a bid for retrial on all of the counts. After plea bargaining discussions, a trial was avoided when Pervez pleaded nolo contendere to the count of illegal export of beryllium. He was released from prison on 4 April 1990 on the basis of time served.
January 5, 1988	Presidential Determination No. 88-5 of January 15, 1988 Recognizing the facts brought out by the Pervez conviction, in January 1988 the Reagan White House invoked and then waived the Solarz amendment.
January 5, 1988	White House Statement on Continuation of Military Aid to Pakistan Recognizing the facts brought out by the Pervez conviction, in January 1988 the Reagan White House invoked and then waived the Solarz amendment.
December 29, 1987	Department of State, Memorandum from INR Director Morton Abramowitz to Mr. Armacost, 'Pakistan—Pervez Case and Solarz Amendment' This INR memorandum tacitly assumed that the facts of the Pervez case fit a decision to invoke the Solarz amendment: despite some recent actions to “restrict nuclear procurement in the US,” the procurement network “could not exist without the umbrella of government approval, protection, and funding.”
December 21, 1987	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Norman Wulf for Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 'Next Steps on Pakistan—Solarz and Symington' Norman Wulf sent Armacost a proposal for applying nonproliferation standards to Palistan even if Reagan rejected application of the Solarz amendment and aid continued.