Report of a Moscow delegation on their impressions of the situation in East Germany. They describe grievances at the root of the June 17 uprising and make suggestions for improvements to the GDR factory system.

Recommendations adopted by the National Security Council at the suggestion of the Psychological Strategy Board on covert actions to be undertaken in the Soviet Satellite States. Authorized by the National Security Council, NSC 158 envisaged aggressive psychological warfare to exploit and heighten the unrest behind the Iron Curtain. The policy was endorsed by President Eisenhower on June 26, 1953.

The demonstrations in Berlin and several other cities had been stopped. Grechko and Tarasow came to the conclusion that "the provocation was prepared in advance, organized, and directed from Western sectors of Berlin." The losses of the strikers in the whole territory of the GDR had been: 84 people killed and wounded, 700 men arrested.

The authors state that Berlin was calm, but there were a few demonstrations in some smaller GDR cities. The authors referred to military intelligence information according to which the US 7th Army and the 12th Air Force Army were put on alert in the US zone at 5.30 a.m. on June 18. But the alert state for the 7th Army was canceled after three hours.

Account of a 31-year-old locksmith who took part in the protests in Plzen.

On 17 June, the Soviet military had stopped all cross-sector travel, causing widespread resentment among many East Germans who worked in the Western sectors or crossed them on their way to work. Under pressure from the East German population in the days following the uprising, SED leaders and local Soviet High Commission officials urged Semenov, then in Moscow for the Extraordinary CPSU Plenum, to normalize the traffic situation in Berlin. Semenov, following Molotov’s orders, informed Ulbricht that the question of free movement across the sector border “must be decided by the [German] comrades themselves, taking the situation into account.” On 7 July, tram and metro traffic between the sectors in Berlin was restored.

The U.S. state department comments on East German announcement to ease government policies following the East German Uprising. They believe the Soviet Union intends to compromise with Western powers on Germany before the rearmament of the Federal Republic through the European Defense Community plan.

Telegram describing discontent of the German population living in East Berlin at the disruption caused by the restrictions imposed on intra-zones travel as a result of the events of 17 June 1953. The telegram recommends actions to be taken to improve the movement of people across the Berlin border.

Excerpt of a memorandum from Lavrentiy Beria to the CPSU CC Presidium regarding mass defections from the GDR. By early May 1953, declining conditions in the GDR finally started to draw the attention of the Soviet leadership. Lavrentiy Beria’s 6 May report to the CPSU Presidium is one of the first high-level documents to reflect concerns about the situation, in particular the increased flight of farmers and small businessmen brought about by the forced socialization policy. Beria may have been prompted to submit this report by the discussion of the German issue at a CPSU Presidium meeting on 5 May.

Cable to the Soviet leadership describing the situation in East Berlin after the imposition of the curfew. The cable reports that at least 700 people have been arrested in East Germany, 300 of which were in the Soviet sector of Berlin. East German police and Soviet troops have taken control of the border of East Berlin to prevent "provocateur elements" from entering the Soviet sector.