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Documents

August 28, 1962

Conversation of Cde. N. S. Khrushchev and acting United Nations Secretary General U Thant, 28 August 1962

Khrushchev and Thant discuss the possibility of a visit by Khrushchev to the UN General Assembly. Khrushchev says a visit is not likely until the Americans, French, British and Germans are ready to negotiate a solution to the Berlin question. Khrushchev outlines the Soviet position and says that the Soviet Union will sign a unilateral peace treaty with the GDR if their conditions are not met. He says that the SU would agree to UN intervention and to a multilateral peace treaty, which would avert international conflict and war. Khrushchev suggests that the UN headquarters be transferred to West Germany due to high costs and discrimination in New York. He identifies additional issues for discussion: the admittance of the People's Republic of China into the UN, the Taiwan-China issue, and disarmament. Thant and Khrushchev discuss the obstacles to resolution of the German question, including public opinion in America. They also discuss American dominance in the UN Secretariat, free trade, and the Common Market, among other topics.

December 19, 1979

Letter by the Chairman of the SPD, Brandt, to President of Romania, Ceausescu

A letter from Willy Brandt to Nicolae Ceausescu. He offers congratulations for Ceausescu's recent reelection and addresses the topic of arms control.

June 20, 1967

On Soviet Policy following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East

East German Document describing the speech by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This German translation of Brezhnev's speech was circulated to the SED leadership.

November 21, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 26044, Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev instructing him to explain to the Chinese and Koreans the reasoning behind Vyshinsky's demand that the demarcation line be established at the 38th parallel rather than at the present front line.

October 30, 1956

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 30 October 1956

The Presidium decides to promulgate a declaration on Hungary in which Soviet withdrawal and relations with the new government will be addressed. Members discuss the language of the new declaration and the advice of the CPC CC regarding the status of Soviet troops. The declaration is also intended to address the broader crisis in Soviet relations with people’s democracies.

November 3, 1956

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 3 November 1956, with Participation by J. Kadar, F. Munnich, and I. Horvath

Kadar argues that the source of mistakes in the past resulted from the monopoly that a handful of Hungarians had on relations with the Soviet Union. Rakosi is singled out as a source for previous difficulties. Kadar believes that forming a new revolutionary government is the only way to undermine the violence of the counterrevolution and prevent Nagy from acting as cover for such activities. To garner support amongst workers, Kadar argues that the new government must not be a Soviet puppet.

December 15, 1972

Secret Telegram from Moscow to Warsaw, No. 13698

This gives a short overview of Chinese foreign policy in light of Communist and Soviet attitudes and perceptions in China. A possible Soviet response to such attitudes is suggested.

October 29, 1980

Session of the CPSU CC Politboro on 'Materials for a Friendly Working Visit to the USSR by Polish Leaders'

The CPSU CC Politboro discusses the anti-socialist movement in Poland, and how the Polish leadership should deal with the crisis. The Politboro begins to form an economic solution for Poland.

October 31, 1980

Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, 'On the Results of a Visit to the USSR by the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, Cde. S. Kania, and the Chairman of the PPR Council of Ministers, Cde. J. Pinkowski'

A visit from Polish leadership reveals the extent of the crisis. Brezhnev believes that the Polish leadership is capable of maintaining control and quelling the counter-revolution, but that Poland is in dire need of economic assistance from the USSR.

January 13, 1979

Minutes of Conversation, Todor Zhivkov – Leonid Brezhnev

Leonid Ilyich analyzes the establishment of US-Chinese diplomatic relations and recent developments in Iran and the Middle East. Todor Zhivkov talks about Bulgaria’s economic development and the Soviet cancellation of Bulgarian debt.

Pagination