Skip to content

Results:

1 - 4 of 4

Documents

April 5, 1946

Cable from B. Smith to Secretary of State

Ambassador Smith and Stalin discuss relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, both expressing their desire to avoid a deterioration of relations in the post-war time frame.

April 12, 1980

Address by Vice President Mondale to the United States Olympic Committee, 'US Call for an Olympic Boycott'

Vice President Mondale addresses the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), advocating for President Carter's proposed boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Later that day, the USOC voted to uphold the boycott.

August 3, 1972

Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 31-72, 'Indian Nuclear Developments and their Likely Implications'

Prepared as part of the NSSM 156 policy review, this Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) concluded that the chances of India making a decision to test were “roughly even,” but the post-mortem analysis [see "Why now?," 18 May 1974] argued that based on its own findings, the conclusion ought to have been 60-40 in favor of a decision to test. In its analysis of the pros and cons of testing, the SNIE found that the “strongest factors impelling India to set off a test are: the belief that it would build up [its] international prestige; demonstrate India's importance as an Asian power; overawe its immediate South Asian neighbors; and bring enhanced popularity and public support to the regime which achieved it.” The drafters further noted that a test would be “extremely popular at home, where national pride is riding high” and that supporters of a test believed that it would make the world see India as “one of the world’s principal powers.” The arguments against a test included adverse reactions from foreign governments that provided economic assistance, but the estimate noted that foreign reactions were “becoming less important” to India.

March 11, 1953

Memorandum of Discussion at the 136th Meeting of the National Security Council

The US National Security Council discusses the effect that Stalin’s death had on Soviet policy and on Communist Parties outside of the USSR, as well as the opportunity it provided the US to use Stalin’s death in a psychological strategy to influence the Soviets. The Council also discusses the possibility of negotiations for a settlement with the Soviets in Korea.