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Documents

March 24, 1975

Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Instructions

In this hypothetical scenario, enemy forces have attacked Maritime Front troops with nuclear and chemical weapons. This document directs the troop leadership to modify their route to avoid contaminated areas, decontaminate all contaminated units, and repair and/or replenish their chemical equipment.

March 24, 1975

Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Combat Instruction No. 17 for Radioelectronic Warfare of the Maritime Front

Part of the Soyuz-75 military exercise, this document updates the Warsaw Pact Maritime Front on the status of enemy communications capabilities. Due to their use of a nuclear weapon and conventional warfare, the Warsaw Pact forces have successfully disrupted enemy communication. The Maritime Front is now ordered to "suppress enemy radio relay communications" during impending military confrontations.

March 24, 1975

Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Combat Instruction No. 04 of the Maritime Front

Part of the Soyuz-75 military exercise, this document provides the Warsaw Pact Maritime Front with information on enemy losses and opportunities to mount an offensive strike. In this hypothetical scenario, the Maritime Front is charged with destroying enemy airfields, advancing westward, and occupying the North Sea coast, where their troops and allied navies will establish a defense of their position.

March 19, 1975

Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Combat Instruction No. 2 for Reconnaissance of the Maritime Front

This document describes the present military situation in Europe as part of the "Soyuz-75" military exercise. Having inflicting damage on NATO with nuclear strikes, the Polish Maritime Front must now gauge the current condition and location of Western military forces in Europe.

March 19, 1975

Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Combat Order No. 1 of the 4th Army

This document describes the locations, movements, and goals of Warsaw Pact forces in their theoretical confrontation with NATO under the "Soyuz-75" military exercise.

March 19, 1975

Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Operational Directive No. 2 of the Maritime Front

This document chronicles continuing developments in the hypothetical "Soyuz-75" military exercise. After two days of battle, Eastern forces have overpowered the West. However, due to the deployment of nuclear weapons, the zone between the rivers Elbe and Oder has become radioactive. In light of the possibility that the West may soon deploy reserve forces, the document directs the Polish Maritime Front to plan an offensive towards Berlin, Hannover, and Brussels with the goal of defeating Western forces in northern West Germany. By the end of March, the Maritime Front is to occupy the Jutland peninsula and reach the North Sea coast at the border of France. Finally, the document directs the Maritime Front to a defense of its position on the North Sea and prescribes the use of nuclear weapons against enemy forces.

March 22, 1975

Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Combat Instruction No. 1 of the Maritime Front

This document describes the developing military situation in the hypothetical "Soyuz-75" military exercise. The Polish Maritime Front has successfully defeated NATO after five days of battle and reached the Weser River in Germany, which empties into the North Sea. However, Western forces retain the capacity to remobilize. Therefore, the document directs the Maritime Front to establish a defense of its position on the North Sea.

September 6, 1976

Military Exercise Tarcza-76 Instruction No. 1 of the Northern Front for Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

This document describes a Warsaw Pact military exercise. The document describes the enemy's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, particularly with regards to nuclear weapons.

April 14, 1988

Lecture by Sergei Akhromeyev, 'The Current State of Soviet Military Doctrine'

This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”

Pagination