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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Emir Farid Chehab

Emir Farid Chehab Collection

Gyeongbokgung

East Asia

South Korea

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Sino-Soviet Relations

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898- 1976

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893- 1976

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879- 1953

Kim Il Sung, 1978

Kim, Il Sung

1912- 1994

Press Briefing by Permanent Observer of Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the UN, 7 July 1976.

Inter-Korean Relations

Dr. Syngman Rhee, 1939

Syngman Rhee Era

Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

Dr. Syngman Rhee, 1939

Rhee, Syngman

1875- 1965

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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Documents

March 27, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Hubert Humphrey and ACDA Director Foster, 'Ambassador Foster’s Briefing of Vice President on NPT,' with enclosure, 'Questions Most Likely to be Asked on NPT' During this conversation, Director Foster briefed Vice President Humphrey about the progress of the NPT. Foster said that he was willing to meet Germany’s concerns about such issues as protecting its civil nuclear industry and a future European federation. Moreover, noting that Washington had to discuss the NPT with other countries that could “otherwise go nuclear,” Foster worried that a long delay caused by consultations could “jeopardize the chance of the rest of the world getting signed up.”
March 21, 1967	US Department of State Airgram CA-6579 to US Embassy Moscow, 'Kosygin's Remarks on Non-Proliferation in London' In this Airgram, the U.S. embassy in Bonn sent a translation of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin's tough statement on the NPT at a press conference in London. Kosygin stated (of West Germany) "whether she wants this or not, such a document should be signed, because we will not allow the Federal Republic of Germany to possess nuclear weapons."
March 10, 1967	US Embassy Bonn Telegram 10500 to State Department, 'Ambassador Foster’s Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger' To try to strengthen West German confidence, ACDA director William C. Foster met with Chancellor Kiesinger, who expressed concern about the danger of “erosion” and “uncertainty” in U.S.-West German relations and the need for more time for consultations. Kiesinger’s “own idea was that it would have been better …to have discussed all aspects of non-proliferation ‘behind locked doors’ before any intention of signing the treaty had become public.”
March 1, 1967	Gottfried William Moser, ACDA/Bureau of International Relations, 'Consultations with the FRG' In this report and after criticism over the NPT in West Germany, ACDA official G. William Moser looked into the chronology of U.S.-West German interactions. Noting that Washington had “stood foursquare with [the FRG] on the question of maintaining the MLF option under a non-proliferation treaty,” he highlighted a decision made by Rusk on 18 October 1966 to defer consultations with Bonn until he was sure that the Soviets were “serious” about the new Article I language. He concluded that Washington may need to explain Rusk's rationale.
February 22, 1967	US Department of State, Oral Note, 'Interpretations Regarding Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Formulations' As an assurance to the Germans and other NATO allies, ACDA and the State Department drew up a memorandum on the interpretation of the NPT draft treaty. The key point was that the treaty “deals only with what is prohibited, not what is permitted.”
January 17, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency George Bunn and Soviet Counselor Yuli M. Vorontsov, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty and Other Arms Control Matters' Information about the recent U.S.-West German discussions had leaked to the press and in this conversation, Vorontsov “wanted to know what we had told the Germans with respect to participation in a European nuclear force.” Bunn told him that the “Germans were concerned that nothing in the treaty stand in the way of steps which might ultimately produce a United States of Europe.”
January 13, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between ACDA Director William C. Foster and West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, 'Draft Articles of Non-Proliferation Treaty,' with draft treaty attached In this conversation, ACDA director Foster met with Ambassador Knappstein for an extended discussion of the NPT. Topics included the treaty’s compatibility with a future European federation, consultations by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, the definition of a nuclear weapon, and the prohibition of national control over “peaceful nuclear explosives.”
December 29, 1966	Memorandum of Conversation with West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, 'German Concern Over Draft NPT Text' In this conversation, Ambassador Knappstein expressed concern over the draft of the NPT that Washington and Moscow had agreed on. Knappstein worried that the draft articles would foreclose “all of the available options for participation in nuclear defense."
November 28, 1966	Adrian Fisher, Acting Director ACDA, and Leonard S. Meeker, Legal Adviser to the Secretary, 'Revised Draft Language for a Non-Proliferation Treaty,' enclosing Memorandum for the President, 'Suggested Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty' Further review on the proposed NPT by ACDA and State Department lawyers in this report concluded that the language would “not disturb existing bilateral relationships,” that is, arrangements to provide U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiled in NATO countries for the use of West German forces and other allies in the event of war.
November 26, 1966	Message to the President from Secretary Rusk In this message, Secretary Rusk reported to President Johnson that the Soviet non-transfer principle, which ruled out MLF-type arrangements but left open other alternatives, was a “good formulation” that would be “acceptable” to the incipient West German “Grand Coalition” government.