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Documents

June 3, 1953

Record of Molotov's Conversation with US Ambassador Bohlen

A follow-up conversation after the one on the 28th of May. The two discuss the talks that were taking place in Panmunjom, and Bohlen mentions the American men with Soviet wives currently residing in the Soviet Union. Molotov is unaware of this situation.

March 25, 1953

Ciphered Telegram from Molotov with a Message to Kim Il Sung

Telegram informing Kim Il Sung that the French government contacted the Soviet government and asked for help in facilitating the release of 14 French citizens (specified) from the DPRK authorities, and to give an exact idea of the fates of those citizens (specified) on which the French authorities have received no information since the beginning of the war in Korea.

March 14, 1953

Ciphered Telegram from Razuvaev to Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai

Telegram from Razuvaev discussing POWs and what precedents established at the Geneva Conference must be met. Razuvaev also asks whether their side is ready for immediate repatriation of seriously ill and seriously wounded prisoners of UN troops.

August 14, 1953

Memorandum, President Syngman Rhee to All Diplomatic Officials

Following the ratification of the Armistice Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty, President Rhee conveys that he expects the Armistice to fail because the communists will “undoubtedly” violate it and undermine Korean independence. Rhee wants to renew war to secure victory but most importantly to strengthen the ROK-U.S alliance. Following the memorandum he makes twelve points ranging from topic like Korean rehabilitation to prisoners of war from the Korean War.

May 4, 1953

Letter, General Duk Shin Choi to General William K. Harrison, Jr. on Civilian Internees

From April 20 to May 3 1953, Operation Little Switch allowed the exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners of wars between the United Nations, North Korea, and China. In this letter, Major General Choi informs General Harrison that the communist have failed to return hundreds of U.N. POWs because of their broad interpretation of the agreement. General Choi provides a series of steps to improve this agreement but most importantly he urges that the terms “civilian internees” and “displaced person” should be clarified in the Draft Armistice Agreement.

1953

Rules of Procedures Governing Explanations and Interviews by Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

In 1953 the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was created in order to deal with the repatriation of thousands of prisoners of war. For those POWs who wished to not to repatriate, a series of explanations and interviews were held in order to allow them to choose their side in a neutral setting. This is a list of the general provisions of the commission which clarifies and explains who, how, and where these interviews would be held.

1954

Freedom to Non-Repatriated Prisoners of War

This note warns that the communists will try to convince the world that these “freed” prisoners are not really freed and during this processing and resettlement period the world will be watching the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China's actions.

1954

The POW Scandal in Korea

According to A.B Carey, one of the lessons learned from fighting the Kremlin and its “communism” ideology is evidently seen amongst the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war. Both groups of POW not only disapprove of the communism but would also actively fight against it if they had the opportunity. Carey uses ten ideas which denounce the Kremlin as the one responsible for the lies and bellicosities during the Cold War. He also proceeds to demonstrate ways the free world can defeat this communist caucus.

February 9, 1951

Letter, General John B. Coulter to President Syngman Rhee

General writes to President Rhee on the subject of prisoners of war. He states that he has written to EUSAK and is awaiting new instructions to arrive.

May 3, 1951

Letter, President Syngman Rhee to General Coulter

President Rhee writes to General Coulter to address the issue of prisoners of war. After stating that releasing POWs would “demoralize” Korean soldiers, Rhee expresses his concern for POWs forced to fight in the North’s side. Rhee states that “democratic-accepting” POWs can be released only after they pass a series of tests proving them to be anti-communist. Once released, these POWs can “carry their stories of fair treatment under a democratic United Nations.”

Pagination